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Abstract— Multiple autonomous agents interact over a ran-
dom communication network to maximize their individual
utility functions which depend on the actions of other agents.
We consider decentralized best-response with inertia type
algorithms in which agents form beliefs about the future actions
of other players based on local information, and take an action
that maximizes their expected utility computed with respect to
these beliefs or continue to take their previous action. We show
convergence of these types of algorithms to a Nash equilibrium
in weakly acyclic games under the condition that the belief
update and information exchange protocols successfully learn
the actions of other players with positive probability in finite
time given a static environment, i.e., when other agents’
actions do not change. We design a decentralized fictitious play
algorithm with voluntary and limited communication (DFP-
VL) protocols that satisfy this condition. In the voluntary
communication protocol, each agent decides whom to exchange
information with by assessing the novelty of its information and
the potential effect of its information on others’ assessments
of their utility functions. The limited communication protocol
entails agents sending only their most frequent action to agents
that they decide to communicate with. Numerical experiments
on a target assignment game demonstrate that the voluntary
and limited communication protocol can more than halve the
number of communication attempts while retaining the same
convergence rate as DFP in which agents constantly attempt to
communicate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems comprise of interlinked decision-
makers (agents) aiming to maximize objectives that depend
on the actions of other agents in the system. In epidemics,
the preemptive measures taken by individuals affect the
risks associated with socialization [1], [2]. In a smart grid,
multiple devices determine generation and consumption lev-
els to reach a balance while minimizing costs [3], [4]. In
autonomous teams of mobile robots, each robot decides its
direction of movement and position to maximize a team ob-
jective that depends on the movements and positions of other
robots [5]–[7]. In all of these settings, agents have to reason
about the motives of other agents based on local information.
Game theoretic equilibrium concepts, i.e., Nash equilibrium
(NE), provide a benchmark for rational reasoning where
agents assume other agents are also trying to maximize their
individual or team objectives. However, computation of NE is
not feasible given limited computation capabilities and local
information. Here, we develop decentralized game-theoretic
learning algorithms for settings where agents do not know
the incentives of other agents, and need to communicate over
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a random network that is subject to failures in order to reason
about other agents’ actions.
Success of a communication attempt is often subject to
random failures in social and technological settings. More-
over, in social settings communication is often voluntary, i.e.,
agents attempt to communicate upon the need for informa-
tion exchange. In technological settings, communication is
costly to the agents. Because of this, decentralized learning
algorithms in which agents constantly attempt to commu-
nicate are neither realistic representations of information
exchange in social settings, nor practical in technological
settings. Here, we propose decentralized learning algorithms
in which agents consider the effect of their information on
a potentially receiving agent’s beliefs before attempting to
communicate.
In the decentralized game-theoretic learning algorithms
considered in this paper, agents use best-response with inertia
to determine their next actions at each step. In best-response
with inertia, each agent forms beliefs about the actions of
other agents, and takes an action that either maximizes its
expected utility computed with respect to its beliefs (best-
responds) or continues to take its former action (shows
inertia). Whether an agent best-responds or shows inertia
in a given step is random. Agents form beliefs about other
agents’ behavior via information exchanges over a random
communication network. The randomness of communication
means that agents cannot receive information from every
other agent at each step. Given this setting and learning
updates, we show convergence of the best-response with
inertia behavior to a NE of any weakly acyclic game in finite
time almost surely, as long as the information exchange and
belief update protocols ensure that agents are able to learn
another agent’s action if that agent repeats the same action
long enough (Theorem 1).
We call this sufficient condition for convergence (Con-
dition 1) as prediction under static actions. Based on this
condition, we design voluntary communication protocols in
which agents attempt to send information to an agent if they
see the need to communicate (Section IV). Agents determine
the need to communicate based upon the novelty of their
information to the potential receiving agent. That is, each
agent assesses the novelty of their recent information to
other agents. For such an assessment, agents form second
order beliefs, i.e., reason about the beliefs that other agents
have about their behavior. In this voluntary communica-
tion protocol, agents assume other agents act according to
a stationary distribution determined by the past empirical
























(FP) [8]–[10]. Unlike FP, agents cannot keep track of the
empirical frequencies of all the agents when the communi-
cation is random and voluntary. We show that the voluntary
communication protocol satisfies the prediction under static
actions condition when agents attempt to send only the
frequencies of their most frequent actions (Theorem 2). Via
numerical experiments in a target assignment problem, we
demonstrate that the proposed DFP algorithm with voluntary
communication and limited information exchange (DFP-VL)
can perform similar to DFP with constant communication
attempts in convergence rate while more than halving the
communication attempts per link (Section V).
A. Related Literature
FP converges to rational behavior in various games in-
cluding potential [11], weakly acyclic [9], [12], zero-sum
[13], near-potential [14], and stochastic games [15]. In FP,
each agent takes an action that maximizes its expected utility
(best responds) assuming other agents select their actions
randomly from a stationary distribution. Agents assume
this stationary distribution is given by the past empirical
frequency of past actions. FP is not a decentralized algorithm,
since agents need to observe past actions of everyone to be
able to keep track of empirical frequencies, and compute
the expectations of their utilities. Recent works [16]–[19]
consider a decentralized form of the fictitious play, in which
agents form estimates on empirical frequencies of other
agents’ actions by averaging the estimates received from their
neighbors in a communication network. These algorithms are
shown to converge to a NE in weakly acyclic games, i.e.,
games that admit finite best-response improvement paths.
However, they rely on communication with neighbors after
every decision-making step. This assumption ignores the
randomness of communication attempts, e.g., in wireless
communication settings, and the energy costs of commu-
nication. Preliminary versions of this paper either consider
a specific setting for the voluntary communication protocol
design, namely the target assignment game in [5], or focus
on the convergence of a specific communication protocol for
DFP in [20]. Theorem 1 generalizes the convergence results
in DFP and the preliminary results in [5], [20] to show that
a generic inertial best-response type behavior will converge
to a rational action profile as long as there exists a belief
update and information exchange protocol in which agents
are able to learn the actions of other agents when these agents
repeat the same action long enough. We then leverage this
result to design an intuitive and novel class of communication
efficient belief update and information exchange protocols.
In the voluntary information exchange protocols, the as-
sessment of the novelty of information to a potential re-
ceiving agent is based on two metrics: i) novelty of local
information and ii) its potential effect on the belief of the
receiving agent. Such metrics that are based on second order
beliefs (estimating the estimates of the receiving agents)
can provide similar benefits to communication efficiency
in other decentralized game-theoretic learning algorithms
based on, e.g., gradient descent [21]–[24], best-response [25],
ADMM [26], and other adaptive strategies [27]. Indeed,
communication-censoring based protocols that rely on some
form of novelty of information metrics recently proved viable
in reducing communication attempts in distributed stochastic
gradient descent [28], [29] and ADMM [30] in the context of
optimization. In the class of information exchange protocols
considered here, while the novelty of information metric is
sender specific, the metric on potential effect of information
on other’s assessment is receiving agent specific. Thus,
agents manage their local information by deciding whom to
communicate with. This is a novel communication protocol
that relies on agents keeping track of second order beliefs,
i.e., forming beliefs on beliefs, in order to estimate the
novelty of their information to the candidate receiving agent.
II. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS IN TIME-VARYING RANDOM
NETWORKS
A. Notation
We use ||.|| to denote Euclidean norm. The notation ∆(.)
defines the space of probability distributions over given set.
1(.) is indicator function. Its value is 1 if the given condition
is satisfied, otherwise 0.
B. Game-Theoretical Definition
We consider a strategic game Γ among a set of N agents
denoted with N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. Each agent i chooses an
action ai from a common action set A with finitely many
actions, i.e., |A| = K. We represent each action with an
unit vector ek ∈ RK so that A := {e1, e2, · · · , eK}. Each
agent has an utility function ui : AN → R that depends on
the joint action profile (ai, a−i) ∈ AN where −i denotes
the set of all agents, and a−i is the action profile of agents
in the set −i. The strategic game Γ is defined by the tuple
(N ,AN , {ui}i∈N ).
A mixed action (strategy) σi is a probability distribution
over the action space. We define the space of probability
distributions over the action space as ∆(A). A strategy
profile σ = (σi, σ−i) is a joint mixed action profile belonging
to the set of independent probability distributions over the
space of action profiles, i.e., ∆N (A) =
∏
i∈N ∆(A). We
denote the expected utility of agent i given a strategy
profile σ as ui(σ) :=
∑
a∈AN ui(a)σ(a) where σ(a) is the
probability of action profile a ∈ AN .
Next, we describe the standard FP and then introduce a
generalization of FP for random communication networks.
C. Fictitious Play with Inertia
FP is a distributed game-theoretic learning algorithm in
which agents repeatedly take actions in discrete time steps
t = 1, 2, . . . that maximize their expected utilities computed
with respect to some estimate of the other agents’ strategies.
In estimating the strategies of others, each agent assumes
other agents are taking actions drawn from a stationary prob-
ability distribution determined by the empirical frequency of
the past actions of agents. The empirical frequency of agent
i is computed as follows,
fi(t) = (1− ρ)fi(t− 1) + ρai(t), (1)
where ai(t) ∈ A is the action of agent i at time t ∈ N+
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a fading memory constant determining the
update rate of the empirical frequency.
Given the empirical frequencies of other agents f−i(t) =
{fj(t)}j∈N\i, agent i’s expected utility from taking action





In FP with inertia, each agent best-responds with inertia,
i.e., either takes an action that maximizes its expected utility,
or follows its previous action with a small probability ε ∈
(0, 1). Agent i needs to observe the past actions of all agents
in order to compute the empirical frequencies as per (1) so
that it can compute the best response action.
D. Decentralized fictitious play (DFP) in random networks
When communication between agents is subject to fail-
ures, agents do not have immediate and permanent access
to others’ actions. One way to address this problem is by
agents keeping local estimates of empirical frequencies of
past actions, in which each agent forms estimates about the
empirical frequencies of other agents based on information
received from neighboring agents in the communication
network.
The estimate of agent i on agent j’s empirical frequency
in (1) is denoted with f ij(t) ∈ ∆(A). Replacing the
empirical frequencies f−i(t) with the estimates f i−i(t) :=
{f ij(t)}j∈N\{i} in (2), we get the expected utility of agent
i from taking action ai ∈ A denoted as ui(ai, f i−i(t)). As
in standard FP with inertia, agents best-respond with inertia,






−i(t− 1)) w.pr. 1− ε,
ai(t− 1) w.pr. ε.
(3)
In DFP, agents update their local estimates based on
information they receive from agents that send information
over the random communication network.
Specifically, we assume point-to-point communication be-
tween each pair of agents is possible but communication is
subject to random failures. The probability of the existence
of a communication link between agent i ∈ N and agent
j ∈ N \ {i} at time t ∈ N+ is distributed with a Bernoulli
random variable,
cij(t) ∼ Bernoulli(pij(t)), (4)
where the probability of success is 0 ≤ pij(t) < 1.
We denote the random communication network at time t
with G(t) = (N , E(t)) where E(t) is the set of edges realized
according to (4). The random communication network G(t)
belongs to the space of all possible networks G.
We denote the history of the actions and networks up to
time t as H(t) := (AN ×G)t. We define a measurable space
(H(∞),B) as the sequence of actions and networks H(∞)
and the Borel sigma-algebra (B). We let {H(t)}t≥0 be a sub-
sigma algebra of B. The information available to agent i at
time t is denoted with Hi(t).
The information exchange protocol of agent i, de-
noted with Ωi : H(t) → N × H(t), determines the
set of agents agent i is willing to communicate with
(N outi (t) ⊆ N ) and the information agent i shares with them
that is measurable with respect to the information avail-
able Hi(t). Upon receiving information from its neighbors
N ini (t) := {j ∈ N \ {i} : i ∈ N outj (t)}, agent i updates its
estimates about the empirical frequencies of other agents
{f ij(t)}j∈N according to a function Φi,j : H(t) → ∆(A)
that is measurable with respect to the information available
at time t + 1 (Hi(t + 1)). We let Hi(t) be the real-






Ωj(Hj(s))} as a result of the
exchange protocol {Ωj}j∈N . The exchange protocol deter-
mines the information available to each agent in the next time




the convergence analysis, we will be agnostic to the specifics
of the estimate updates (Φi) and the information exchange
process (Ωi), as long as they ensure that agents are able to
learn others’ actions under a static action profile. We state
the condition formally next.
Condition 1 (Prediction under static actions) There ex-
ists a positive probability ε̂ > 0 and a finite time T̂ such
that if an agent j ∈ N repeats the same action for at least
T > T̂ times starting from time t > 0, i.e., aj(s) = ek
for s = t, t + 1, · · · , t+ T − 1 and ek ∈ A, agent i ∈ N
learns agent j’s action with positive probability ε̂ > 0, i.e.,
P(||aj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ|H(t)) ≥ ε̂ for any ξ > 0.
Any estimate update and information exchange process
that satisfies Condition 1 makes sure that agent i’s estimate of
agent j’s action f ij(t) gets close to agent j’s action whenever
agent j repeats its action long enough.
We summarize key steps of the generic DFP next.
Algorithm 1 Generic DFP for Agent i
1: Input: Inertia probability ε and fading constant ρ.
2: Given: f i−i(0) and a(0) for all i ∈ N .
3: for t = 1, 2, · · · do
4: Best-respond: Use f i(t − 1) := {f ij(t − 1)}j∈N\i in
(3)
5: Share information: Use Ωi to determine N outi (t) and
information to be exchanged
6: Observe: Receive information from N ini (t) ∩ {j :
cji(t) = 1}
7: Update estimates: f ij(t + 1) = Φi,j(Hi(t)) for j ∈
N \ i.
8: end for
III. DFP CONVERGENCE FOR WEAKLY ACYCLIC GAMES
We consider convergence of the DFP in the class of weakly
acyclic games which have (finite) sequence of best-response
updates that end up at a pure Nash equilibrium, named as
finite improvement paths [31], [32].
A Nash equilibrium strategy is an (mixed) action profile
in which no individual agent can benefit by unilaterally
switching to another action. A formal definition follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile σ∗ =
(σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ∈ ∆N (A) is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ if





−i) ≥ ui(σi, σ−i), for all σi ∈ ∆(A). (5)
A pure NE strategy profile σ∗ is a NE that selects an action
profile a = (ai, a−i) ∈ AN with probability 1.
A best-response path is a sequence of action profiles
obtained by a single agent best-responding to the current
action profile at each step of the sequence. Next, we provide
a formal definition of weakly acyclic games.
Definition 2 (Weakly Acyclic Games) A game Γ is weakly
acyclic if from any joint action profile a = (ai, a−i) ∈ AN ,




The existence of a finite best-response path ensures that
no agent can improve its utility after some finite number of
iterations. Weakly acyclic games are a broad class of games
that include potential games and its several variants such as
best-response potential and pseudo-potential games.
We consider weakly acyclic games in which optimal action
is unique against others’ actions if other agents take actions
according to a pure NE action profile. Specifically, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For any pure NE action profile a∗ ∈ AN of
the game Γ, it holds that,





This assumption makes sure that agents are not indifferent
between multiple actions at a pure Nash equilibrium.
A. Convergence to a Pure Nash Equilibrium
We show almost sure convergence of joint action profile
a(t) to a pure NE a∗ (Theorem 1). The convergence result
relies on the fact that action profile stays forever at a pure
NE once it reaches the NE (Lemma 2), and there is a
positive probability to reach a pure NE from any action
profile(Lemma 3). Before showing these lemmas, we show
that the best response action of an agent computed with
respect to the estimated empirical frequencies {f ij(t)}j∈N
belongs to the best response action set computed with respect
to the actual actions of others a−i(t), whenever the estimates
are close enough to a−i(t)–see Appendix A for the proof.
Lemma 1 There exists a small enough ξ > 0 such that if
||aj(t) − f ij(t)|| ≤ ξ for agents j ∈ N \ {i} at time step t,
then argmaxai∈A ui(ai, f
i
−i(t)) ⊆ argmaxai∈A ui(ai, a−i)
for all i ∈ N .
Next, we prove that pure NE have absorption property.
When agents play a pure NE and are aware of others’ actions,
agent are going to stay in this pure NE indefinitely.
Lemma 2 (absorption property) Suppose Assumption 1
holds. Assume ||aj(t + T ) − f ij(t + T )|| ≤ ξ where ξ > 0
satisfies Lemma 1 for all pairs of agents (i, j) ∈ N×N \{i}
at time step t + T . Further, let a∗ ∈ AN be a pure NE
action profile and a(t + T ) = a∗. Then, a(s) = a∗ =
(a∗1, a
∗
2, · · · , a∗N ) holds, for all s ≥ t+ T .
Proof : By Assumption 1, the set of optimal ac-
tions given others’ actions a−i(t + T ) = a∗−i is a
singleton given by argmaxai∈A ui(ai, f
i
−i(t + T )) =
argmaxai∈A ui(ai, a
∗
−i) = {a∗i }. Otherwise, by inertia agent
i takes the the same action a∗i . Thus, the joint action profile
remains at the pure NE, i.e., a(s) = a∗, for all s ≥ t+T .
The next lemma states that there is a positive probability
that agents can reach a NE action profile with any commu-
nication scheme that satisfies Condition 1.
Lemma 3 (positive probability of absorption) Suppose
Assumption 1 and Condition 1 hold. Let a(t) be the joint
action profile at time t and f i(t) := {f ij(t)}j∈N be agent
i’s estimate on all agents at time t. At time t, we define the
following event for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N \ {i},
E(t) ={a(s) = a∗, ||aj(s̄+ T )− f ij(s̄+ T )|| ≤ ξ
for all s ∈ {s̄, s̄+ 1, · · · , s̄+ T − 1}
for some s̄ ∈ {t, t+ 1, · · · , t+KNT}}
where a∗ is a pure NE. There exists ξ > 0 small enough
such that the transition probability P(E(t)|H(t)) ≥ ε̄(T ), is
bounded below by ε̄(T ) > 0 and always positive for all t ∈
N+.
Proof: To show the result, we are going to use the fact that
in weakly acyclic games, there exists a finite path from any
action profile to a pure NE. Since, the action set of each
agent is finite and its size is equal to K, there exist KN
different joint action profiles in total. Hence, it is the upper
bound on the length of finite path to a pure NE. Thus, if
a(t) = a∗, the pure NE is reached and, the proof is trivially
completed.
If a(t) 6= a∗, we are going to exploit the fact that the finite
path to a pure NE consists of finite improvement paths. In
each improvement path, only one agent improve its utility
by changing its action. Therefore, all agents firstly stay in
their actions so that it holds ||aj(t + T ) − f ij(t + T )|| ≤
ξ with probability at least ε̂N by Condition 1. Then, by
inertia, at time step t+ T , there exists a positive probability
ε(N−1), N −1 agents continue to stay in the same action for
one more time step, and only one agent takes the optimal
action against others with probability (1− ε). Since it holds
argmaxai∈A ui(ai, f
i
−i(t + T )) ⊆ argmaxai∈A ui(ai, a−i)
by Lemma 1, a finite improvement path can complete with
at least the probability ε1 = ε̂N (1− ε)ε(N−1).
After the completion of an improvement path, the event of
another improvement path until a∗ is reached has at least the
same positive probability ε1. As stated before, total number
of improvement paths cannot exceed KN times. Once a(s̄) =
a∗, the probability of learning other’s actions is again ε̂N
corresponding to the event that all agents repeat their actions
at least T times. Using this, the probability to reach a pure
NE is bounded below as P(E(t)|H(t)) ≥ ε̄ = εKN1 ε̂N .
Above result leverages the fact that as long as each agent
recognizes others’ empirical frequencies converge to a pure
action profile when they continue to take the same action,
an agent can improve its utility. Now, we are ready to state
the main convergence theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and Condition 1 hold.
Let {a(t) = (a1(t), (a2(t), · · · , aN (t))}t≥1 be a sequence
of actions by the DFP Algorithm (Algorithm 1) and random
time-varying communication networks {G(t)}t≥1. The ac-
tion sequence {a(t)}t≥1 converges to a pure NE a∗ of the
game Γ, almost surely.
Proof : By Lemma 2, pure Nash equilibria are the only
absorbing states among joint action profiles. By Lemma
3, there exists a positive probability to reach a pure NE.
Therefore, in finite time with probability 1, a pure NE is
reached and action profile stays same once reached. Thus,
the action sequence {a(t)}t≥1 converges to a pure NE a∗ of
the game Γ, almost surely.
The convergence theorem relies on the idea of absorbing
Markov chains in which pure Nash equilibria are the only
absorbing states among all joint action profiles (states). We
proved almost sure convergence of actions to a pure NE
by the existence of finite improvement paths and the fact
that reaching a pure NE from any joint action profile has a
positive probability.
IV. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND BELIEF UPDATE
PROTOCOLS FOR RANDOM COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
We introduce information exchange Ωi(·) and belief up-
date Φi(·) protocols that aim to reduce the number of
communication attempts while at the same time guaranteeing
that prediction under static actions condition (Condition 1)
holds.
A. Voluntary Communication Protocols
We use two metrics, novelty and belief similarity, to
determine whether agent i attempts to communicate to agent
j or not. The novelty metric is the distance between the
empirical frequency of agent i and its current action denoted
with hii(t) := ||ai(t)− fi(t)||. The belief similarity metric,
defined as hij(t) := ||fi(t) − f j(i)i (t)||, is the distance
between agent i’s empirical frequency fi(t) and the second
order belief of agent i, i.e., agent i’s belief on agent j’s belief
on fi(t) denoted with f
j(i)
i (t). Based on these metrics, agent
i decides to communicate its empirical frequency fi(t) to
agent j if the following logical condition is satisfied,
1(η1 ≤ hii(t) ≤ η2) ∧ 1(hij(t) ≥ η3) (7)
where η2 > η1 ≥ 0 and η3 ≥ 0, 1(·) is the indicator function,
and ∧ is the logical AND operator. Condition (7) determines
the set of agents agent i is willing to communicate with at
time step t, i.e., N outi (t). The set of agents that send their
empirical frequencies to agent i at time step t is given by
N ini (t) = {j ∈ N \ {i} : i ∈ N outj (t)}.
The intuition for the condition in (7) is as follows. The
novelty metric hii(t) has to be between a range for agent
i to initiate a communication attempt. The novelty hii(t)
is likely to be small when agent i takes the same action
for several steps indicating that it may have converged on
an action. If hii(t) is large, it means agent i is undecided,
taking a different action from its past set of actions. When
hii is neither too small or too large, agent i attempts to
communicate. Agent i only attempts to send its empirical
frequency to agent j if it believes agent j does not have an
accurate estimate of its empirical frequency, i.e., if hij is
large enough.
Given the communication scheme, agent i updates its




fj(t), if cji(t) = 1,
f ij(t− 1), otherwise.
(8)
That is, agent i replaces its estimate on agent j’s empirical
frequency with the empirical frequency received from agent
j upon a successful communication attempt. Otherwise, its
estimate remains the same.
In computing the belief similarity hij(t), agent i has
to form and update beliefs about agent j’s belief on its
own empirical frequency f ji (t). This can be done via an
acknowledgement process where each time agent i makes
a successful communication attempt to agent j, agent j
sends back 1-bit acknowledgement signal. We allow the
acknowledgement signal to be subject to failures with a
Bernoulli variable bij(t) ∼ Bernoulli(βij(t)) with success
rate 0 ≤ βij(t) ≤ 1. We note that the acknowledgement pro-
cedure is executed if and only if agent i receives information
from agent j. Thus, we have P(bij(t) = 0|cji(t) = 0) = 1.
Otherwise, we have P(bij(t) = 1|cji(t) = 1) > βij(t).
Given the acknowledgement scheme, agent i’s second order





fi(t), if bji(t) = 1,
f
j(i)
i (t− 1), otherwise.
(9)
Upon receiving the acknowledgement, agent i knows that its
empirical frequency is transmitted to agent j, and agent j has
updated its belief as per (8). In a scenario where cij(t) = 1
and bji(t) = 1, empirical frequencies and estimates align,
i.e., f ji (t) = f
j(i)
i (t) = fi(t).
Remark 1 In the information exchange and belief update
protocols described above, each agent keeps an estimate of
the empirical frequencies of all other agents {f ij(t)}j∈N ,
an N × K real-valued matrix, and second order beliefs
about other agents’ estimates about its empirical frequency
{f j(i)i (t)}j∈N , an N × K real-valued matrix. Agent i at-
tempts to send its empirical frequency fi(t), a real-valued
vector of length K, to a subset of agents in N according
to the condition in (7). In the decentralized FP considered
in [18], each agent shares their estimates of all the other
agents, {f ij(t)}j∈N , an N ×K real-valued matrix, to all of
their neighbors at each step.
Remark 2 The condition in (7) can be less or more selective
depending on the constants η1, η2, and η3. The information
exchange protocol becomes more selective as η1 and η3 is
increased and η2 is decreased close to η1. In contrast, if
η1 = η3 = 0 and η2 is large enough, then each agent
broadcasts their empirical frequency to all the agents at
each step. If η3 = 0, then there is no need for agents to
keep second order beliefs as the term with hij(t) in (7) is
no longer relevant. If η2 is large enough and η3 = 0, the
information exchange protocol is equivalent to the commu-
nication censoring protocol used for distributed optimization
algorithms [28]–[30].
B. Limited Information Communication








instead of their empirical frequencies. When an agent j
successfully sends the maximum value υj(t) and its index
κj(t) (11) to agent i, agent i needs to reconstruct a well-
defined empirical frequency and update its belief f ij(t)
accordingly. Upon successful communication of υj(t) and
κj(t), the reconstructed belief f ij(t) has to satisfy∑
k∈K
f ijk(t) = 1, f
i
jk(t) ≥ 0, f ijκi(t)(t) ≥ υi(t), (12)
where f ijk denotes the kth index. While the first two con-
straints above define a proper distribution over the space of
actions, the third constraint makes sure that the receiving
agent uses the information received. There could multiple
update rules Φi(κj(t), υj(t)) that satisfy the conditions in
(12). For instance, one update rule can assume full support
on the most frequent action of agent j, i.e., f ijκj(t)(t) = 1 and
f ijk(t) = 0 for k ∈ K\κj(t). Another update rule can assume
actions other than the most common are equally likely, i.e.,
f ijκi(t)(t) = υj(t) and f
i
jk(t) = (1 − υj(t))/(|K| − 1) for
k ∈ K \ κj(t).
Remark 3 The limited communication protocol described
further reduces the information sent per communication
attempt to a single real value υi(t) and an integer κi(t).
C. Convergence of Communication and Belief Update Pro-
tocols
We describe the specific steps of the DFP with limited and
voluntary communication protocols (DFP-VL) in Algorithm
2. Step 4 corresponds to the best response step in Algorithm
1. Steps 5-7 correspond to the information sharing and
observation steps in Algorithm 1. Steps 8-9 update the
empiricial frequency estimates and second order beliefs.
Algorithm 2 DFP-VL for Agent i
1: Input: The parameters ρ, ε, η1, η2, η3.




i (0) and a(0) for all i ∈ N .
3: for t = 1, 2, · · · do
4: Agent i takes action ai(t) using (3).
5: DetermineN outi (t) by checking (7) for all j ∈ N\{i}.
6: Transmit υi(t) and κi(t) to agent j ∈ N outi .
7: Send an acknowledgement signal to agent j ∈
N ini (t) ∩ {j : cji(t) = 1}.
8: Update {f ij(t)}j∈N\{i} using (8) .
9: For agent {j ∈ N outi ∩ {j : bji(t) = 1}}, i.e.,
if communication and acknowledgement are success-
ful, update f j(i)i (t) = f
i
i (t) accordingly, otherwise
f
j(i)




Theorem 2 Suppose the communication and acknowledge-
ment success probabilities are lower bounded by a positive
value, i.e., pij(t) > ν > 0 and βji(t) > ν > 0
for all t ∈ N+ and i ∈ N , j ∈ N . Let {a(t) =
(a1(t), (a2(t), · · · , aN (t))}t≥1 be a sequence of actions gen-
erated by the DFP-VL (Algorithm 2). Then, Condition 1 is
satisfied for any ξ > 0 given small enough 0 ≤ η1 < ξ/2,
large enough ξ/2 < η2, and small enough 0 ≤ η3 ≤ ξ/2
such that if an agent j ∈ N repeats the same action for at
least T > T̂ times starting from time t > 0, i.e., aj(s) = ek
for s = t, t + 1, · · · , t + T − 1 and ek ∈ A, agent i ∈ N
learns agent j’s action with positive probability ε̂ > 0, i.e.,
P(||aj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ|H(t)) ≥ ε̂.
Proof: See Appendix.
Theorem 2 implies that DFP-VL converges to a pure NE
of any weakly acyclic game via Theorem 1.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We investigate the performance of different communi-
cation protocols in terms of convergence rate and cost of
communication in the target assignment game.
A. Target Assignment Game
A team of N agents aim to cover N targets with minimum
effort. Given the decentralized decision-making setting, we
can represent the problem as a game with the following
utility function for agent i,






















































Fig. 1. Convergence results over 100 replications. (a) Convergence of empirical frequencies to pure NE 1
N
∑
i∈N ||f ii (t)− a∗i || on average. We obtain





j∈N\{i} ||f ii (t)−f
j
i (t)||.(c) Average attempt





where ai = ek ∈ RK is an unit vector and 1a−ik=0 ∈
{0, 1}K is a binary vector whose kth index is 1 if none
of the other agents j ∈ N \ {i} selects target k, and
otherwise the kth index is equal to 0. The distance vector
di = [di1, · · · , dik, · · · , diK ] ∈ RK+ measures the distance
between agent i and each target k in 2D plane, where
dik = ||θi − θk||. Agent i obtains a positive utility that
is inversely proportional to the distance of the agent to the
selected target if the target is not selected by another agent
j. Otherwise, agent i receives zero utility. Given the utility
function (13), any joint action that is one-to-one assignment
between agents and targets is a pure NE.
In the numerical experiments, we consider a target as-
signment problem with N = 20 agents and K = 20 targets.
Positions of agents and targets are randomly generated in a
2-D plane. Target positions are generated with polar coordi-
nates whose radii are uniformly sampled from 15 to 20, and
angular coordinates are also uniformly sampled between 0
and 2π. Similarly, the positions of agents on the x-y plane
are determined by sampling from a normal distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 independently for each axis.
Using the positions, distances between agents and targets are
computed.
The communication and acknowledgement probability for
each link are given as pij(t) = 0.6 and βij(t) = 0.9 for
all t ≥ 1 and pairs of agents. Initial empirical frequencies
of agents fi(0) are set to uniform discrete distribution, i.e.,
fik = 1/K for k = {1, . . . ,K}. We run each simulation for
Tf = 10, 000 steps.
B. Effects of the Communication Protocol
We compare three versions of the DFP-VL algorithm to
the standard DFP in which agents attempt to communicate
with all the agents after each decision. In DFP-VL1 we have
all the communication bounds in (7) relevant. In DFP-VL2,
we ignore the upper bound on hii(t) by making η2 large. In
DFP-VL3, agents attempt to communicate with all the other
Parameters
DFP-VL1 DFP-VL2 DFP-VL3 DFP
η1 0.01 0.01 - -
η2 0.6 - 0.7 -
η3 0.01 0.01 - -
ε 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9
ρ 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES OF ALGORITHMS
agents as long as hii(t) is bounded by η2. See Table I for
specific parameter values.
DFP achieves fastest convergence rates and ends with
closest distances to pure NE on average (Fig. 1(a)). DFP-
VL1 and DFP-VL2 achieve comparable convergence rates
to DFP. DFP-VL3 is the slowest algorithm but shows con-
vergence at acceptable rate around 0.1 on average at time
Tf = 10, 000. We observe that constant communication in
DFP achieves a faster convergence of beliefs, while volun-
tary communication have a slower convergence in beliefs
as shown in Fig. 1(b). Together, Figs. 1(a-b) signify that
communication protocols increase belief error but preserve
rate of convergence to an equilibrium.
DFP-VL1 and DFP-VL2 utilize 44% and 46% of the
communication links, respectively while DFP-VL3 uses 90%
of the communication links on average at any point in time
(Fig. 1(c)). DFP-VL1 and DFP-VL2 start at full usage of
links and then cease the communication attempts almost
entirely toward the end of the simulation horizon. Fig. 1(a)
and (c) highlight that DFP-VL1 and DFP-VL2 have a faster
rate of convergence to NE with a smaller communication
effort than DFP-VL3.
C. Parameter Sensitivity
We assess the performance of DFP-VL under different
communication thresholds in Fig. 2. Here we consider a
higher fading and a smaller inertia values compared to Fig.
1. Compared with the baseline case (DFP-VL1 shown with




































































Fig. 2. Convergence results of DFP-VL with different parameter values over 100 replications. Fading rate ρ = 0.8 and inertia probability ε = 0.1. (a)
Convergence of empirical frequencies to pure NE 1
N
∑






j∈N\{i} ||f ii (t)−
fji (t)||. (c) Average attempt per communication link over time.
black line in Fig. 1), we observe that DFP-VL performs
better with higher fading and smaller inertia as indicated
by the faster convergence to equilibrium by green, blue and
red lines in Fig. 2. The reason is that agents utilize new
information faster and update their best-response actions
to others accordingly per successful communication when
fading is higher and inertia is smaller. In contrast, in standard
DFP with constant communication attempts, slow fading rate
and increased probability of inertia yields better performance
in terms of convergence. This is because in standard DFP,
agents are more likely to receive new information at each
step. Slow fading rate and increased probability of inertia
prevent agents from being oversensitive to new information.
We also observe that higher fading and smaller inertia further
reduce the communication attempts, e.g., DFP-VL utilizes
27% of the communication links in Fig. 2(c) green line.
Lastly, we observe a counter intuitive phenomenon in Fig.
2(a-c). As the region of communication is increased, i.e., we
decrease η1, increase η2, and decrease η3, not only we get
faster convergence and smaller belief errors, but also we see
a reduction in communication attempts on average (observe
green line with η1 = 0.001, η2 = 0.9 and η3 = 0.001
tread below rest of the lines in Fig. 2(a-c)). This is counter
intuitive because we would expect that a larger region of
communication would lead to more communication attempts.
However, the frequency of communication attempts is lower
in green line except for the first few initial steps. This shows
the value of initial communication attempts. Communication
in the first few steps allow agents to coordinate early on
leading to a smaller belief error, faster convergence to an
equilibrium, and reduction in communication attempts later
on. Another factor is that smaller η1 and η3 values yield more
precise estimates of agent behavior. This allows agents to be
sure early on about the target selections of other agents, and
thus eliminate certain targets.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered inertial best-response type algorithms for
learning Nash equilibria in weakly acyclic games in random
communication networks. We showed that the actions gen-
erated from inertial best-response type algorithms converge
to a pure Nash equilibrium in weakly acyclic games almost
surely under the condition that agents are learn to predict
the actions of other agents when those agents repeat the
same action. We then proposed voluntary communication
protocols for FP in which agents decided who to send the
empirical frequencies of their actions based on the novelty of
empirical frequency to the receiving agent. We showed that
the proposed communication protocols satisfy the prediction
under static actions condition, and thus are guaranteed to
converge to a pure NE. Compared to standard DFP with
constant communication attempts, numerical experiments
showed that the voluntary communication protocol signif-
icantly reduces communication attempts while achieving a
similar convergence rate to a NE.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Since the expectation of the utility function ui : AN → R
is linear and Lipschitz continuous for all i ∈ N , there exists
a constant L > 0 for all i ∈ N such that the following holds,




||aj − f ij(t)||,
(15)
≤ L(N − 1)ξ < µ
2
, (16)
for some µ > 0. Next, we define the following mutually
exclusive subsets of action space A for all i ∈ N ,
A1(i) = {ek1 ∈ A |ai = ek1 ∈ argmaxui(ai, a−i)}, (17)
A2(i) = {ek2 ∈ A |ai = ek2 /∈ argmaxui(ai, a−i)}. (18)
Since they are mutually exclusive subsets, it holds Ai =
A1(i) ∪ A2(i) and A1(i) ∩ A2(i) = ∅. Then, optimal set
over a finite feasible set of utility functions cannot be empty
set A1(i) 6= ∅, while it is possible that A2(i) = ∅. Firstly,
suppose that A2(i) 6= ∅. Hence, there exist actions a′i ∈
A1(i) and a′′i ∈ A2(i) such that,
ui(a
′′
i , a−i)− µ < ui(a′i, a−i). (19)
for some µ > 0 satisfying (14). Note that (16) holds for both
actions a′i ∈ A1(i) and a′′i ∈ A2(i),














−i(t)) to the left and
right hand sides of (19), respectively. Similarly, we subtract
the same corresponding terms from the left and right hand










Further, for any two best-response actions, a′i ∈ A1(i) and
ã′i ∈ A1(i), it can be shown that
|ui(a′i, f i−i(t))− ui(ã′i, f i−i(t))| < µ. (23)
As a result, using its estimates f i−i(t), agent i only chooses
an action from its optimal action set A1(i) for the both cases








B. Proof of Theorem 2
We note that the randomness stems from inertia, and com-
munication and acknowledgement failures. The probability
of given events in the following part, only depends on these
random variables. Thus, showing that the event {||aj(t +
T ) − f ij(t + T || ≤ ξ} has a positive probability follows
from positive probability of successful communication and
acknowledgement, and the positive probability of agent j
repeating the same action via inertia. Consider the following
events:
E1(t) = {||aj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤
||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )||+ ||fj(t+ T )− f i(j)j (t)||}
E2(t) = {||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ/2}
E3(t) = {||fj(t+ T )− f i(j)j (t+ T )|| ≤ ξ/2}
By triangle equality we have,
||aj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤
||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )||+ ||fj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )||.
(25)
Then, via triangle inequality, showing that E1(t) happens
with positive probability reduces to showing the positive
probability of the following event,
E4(t) = {||fj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤
||fj(t+ T )− f i(j)j (t+ T )||}.
Given the assumptions on η1, η2 and η3, condition (7) is
satisfied, i.e., agent j attempts to communicate with agent i,
when E2 and E3 is true.
In the event that agent j successfully communicates with
agent i and receives an acknowledgement, we have f ij(t +
T ) = f
i(j)
j (t+ T ). Thus,
P(E1(t)|H(t)) = P(E4(t)|H(t)) ≥ ν2, (26)
where the inequality is via the lower bound on communica-
tion and acknowledgement success probabilities.
Next, the event E2(t) is certain given repetition of the
same action by agent j, and by Lemma 4 (i) there exists a
small enough ξ1 ≤ ξ/2,
P(E2(t)|H(t)) = 1. (27)
Now, let φj(t+T ) be the estimate of empirical frequency
of agent j constructed using limited information υj(t + T )
(10) and κj(t+ T ) (11) at time t+ T . By triangle equality,
we have
||fj(t+ T )− f i(j)j (t+ T )|| ≤ ||fj(t+ T )− φj(t+ T )||
+ ||φj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )||+ ||f ij(t+ T )− f
i(j)
j (t+ T )||.
(28)
Now, consider the following events,
E5(t) = {||fj(t+ T )− φj(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ/2}
E6(t) = {|||φj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| = 0}
E7(t) = {|||f ij(t+ T )− f
i(j)
j (t+ T )|| = 0}
Given the repetition of the same actions by agents j ∈ N \
{i} and Lemma 4 (ii), there exists a small enough ξ2 ≤
ξ/2 similar to (27), P(E5(t)|H(t)) = 1. Further, see the
remaining events have also positive probability as the result
of successful communication and acknowledgement,
P(E6(t)|H(t)) ≥ ν > 0, (29)
P(E7(t)|H(t)) ≥ ν2 > 0. (30)
From (28) and the bounds above, we have
P(E3(t)|H(t)) ≥ P(E5(t), E6(t), E7(t)|H(t)) ≥ ν2 > 0.
(31)
Thus, there exists a positive real number ε̂ > 0 such that,
P(||aj(t+ T )− f ij(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ|H(t)) ≥
P(E1(t), E2(t), E3(t)|H(t)) ≥ ν2 = ε̂ > 0. (32)
C. Technical Result
Lemma 4 Let {a(t) = (a1(t), a2(t), · · · , aN (t))}t≥1 be a
sequence of actions generated by the DFP-VL (Algorithm 2).
Suppose agent j ∈ N \ {i} repeats the same action aj(s) =
ek at least T > 0 times for s = t, t+1, · · · , t+ T − 1. Then,
there exist 0 < ξ1 and 0 < ξ2 such that following statements
hold,
i) ||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ1 for all j ∈ N \ {i},
ii) ||φj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )|| ≤ ξ2 for all j ∈ N \ {i},
where φj(t) is the reconstructed belief of agent j’s empirical
frequency using υj(t) and κj(t) defined in (10) and (11),
respectively.
Proof:
i) From (1), it holds that if ek is repeated for any τ ∈
{0, 1, 2, · · · } starting from time t by a player j ∈ N \
{i},
fj(t+ τ) = (1− ρ)τfj(t) + (1− (1− ρ)τ )ek, (33)
Subtracting ek from both sides and taking the norm we
obtain the following,
||fj(t+ τ)− ek|| = ||(1− ρ)τ (fj(t)− ek)||, (34)
= O((1− ρ)τ ). (35)
Therefore, if agent j ∈ N \ {i} repeat the same action
aj(s) = ek) at least T > 0 times for s = t, t+1, · · · , t+
T − 1, there exists a positive upper bound ξ1 > 0,
||aj(t+T )−fj(t+T )|| ≤ ξ1 for all j ∈ N \{i}. (36)
ii) To provide an upper bound on we can use triangle
inequality as below,
||φj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )|| ≤ ||φj(t+ T )− aj(t+ T )||
+ ||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )||.
(37)
Then, notice that ||aj(t + T ) − fj(t + T )|| = O((1 −
ρ)T+1) implies |υj(t) − 1| = O((1 − ρ)T+1). Since
φjκi(t)(t + T ) ≥ υj(t) via (12), it also holds ||φj(t +
T ) − aj(t + T )|| = O((1 − ρ)T+1). Thus, given the
repetition of the same action, there exists a positive
upper bound ξ2 > 0,
||φj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )||
≤ ||φj(t+ T )− aj(t+ T )||+ ||aj(t+ T )− fj(t+ T )||
(38)
≤ O((1− ρ)T+1) ≤ ξ2. (39)
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